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Article 5

WHAT WILL BECOME OF PROHIBITION?
The Drys have it. In spite of the fact that National Prohibition has failed and in spite of the fact that nearly everybody knows that it has failed the Eighteenth Amendment is
in the Constitution to stay. All over the great American
"desert" are irreconcilables who pose ostrich-like and shout
their enforcement pronouncements through the resulting
showers of sand. With these people and their dependable
following devotion to Prohibition is an emotion, and we
cannot refute an emotion. In all probability there will always be a sufficient number of these ladies and gentlemen
to prevent any orderly retreat from the unfortunate Constitutional position that we so hastily and hysterically took
in the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. What therefore is to be done?
The Literary Digest recently asked millions of Americans
to vote upon three thoroughly impossible propositions. Many
discerning persons failed to return their ballots because none
of the suggested alternatives was possible of achievement.
A proposition to establish Florida winters and Canadian
summers throughout America would probably be carried in
all States by comfortable majorities, and yet, even in a
country where the reforming potentialities of statute law
are taken to be all-embracing, it is assumed that no one believes that such an establishment is possible. The questions
submitted by the Literary Digest were just as hypothetical
as if they had dealt with the climatic reform mentioned
above. It is impossible to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment.
It is impossible to obtain a valid "wine and beer" law while
the Eighteenth Amendment remains in the Constitution.'
1 Even a conservative attempt by Congress to legalize some description of
beer and wine would unquestionably meet the disapproval of the Supreme Court.
If what Congress permits will not intoxicate it will neither satisfy public demand
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And finally, eleven years of scandalized hypocrisy, public
and private, official and unofficial have convinced all 'who
are susceptible of conviction that possibilities for "strict enforcement" are definitely relegated to "the limbo of forgotten things." If the Digest poll was expected to elicit an accurate and valuable expression upon the "burning question"
we might have been asked simply:
"Are you in favor of continuing the presently constituted system
of National Prohibition in the United States? Yes or No:"

Taking the country by and large, at least three out of
every five persons solicited would answer "No." But three
out of every five persons in the United States cannot repeal the Eighteenth Amendment, nor four out of five nor
five out of six.'There were 36,724,823 popular votes cast
in the Presidential Election of 1928. Of this number, a
minimum of 897,608 apportioned properly in thirteen States
can prevent the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment.2 It
is thus evident that less than three per cent of the American electorate can-and probably will-stand in the way
of any ratification of a repeal of Constitutional Prohibition
even if it is ever possible to persuade two thirds of both
houses of Congress to propose such a repealer. This is a sickening reflection and undoubtedly it does things to our smug
notions of majority rule in democratic America, but if the
rude reality serves to drive home in the average American
mind even a crude idea of what the Constitution of the
United States was intended to be, then may the end be said
to have at least partially justified the means. The facts being what they are, does it then follow that the "three out of
nor cure present enforcement evils; if what Congress permits is intoxicating its
judgment will be reversed by the Supreme Court as violative of the Eighteenth
Amendment.
2 This number is arrived at by taking the sum of a majority of the votes
cast in the following States: New Mexico, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, Idaho, Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, Wyoming, South Carolina, Utah
and Vermont.
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five" must forever yield submissively to the bludgeonings
of a compassionless minority? Let us see:
The Eighteenth Amendment is unique in many respects
but it is singular in this; namely, it is the only amendment
of our National Constitution that is enforced and interpreted
by specific legislation of Congress. The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are unsupported by Federal statutes.
The language of these amendments standing alone, determines a certain public policy of which the courts will take
cognizance in proper cases. State laws are frequently declared unconstitutional because they are adjudged by the
Supreme Court to deprive persons of liberty or property
without "due process of law" (Fourteenth Amendment) and
a State law that would restrict the right of suffrage to white
citizens would be declared void as violative of the Fifteenth
Amendment. The failure of Congress to pass interpretative
enforcement legislation for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments does not therefore prevent these Amendments
from being effective in the indicated cases. On the contrary,
that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment providing for the
decreased Congressional representation of those States
whose laws impose extraordinary restrictions upon the exercise of suffrage have been entirely ineffectual for the
reason that Congress has consistently refused to supply the
necessary enforcement legislation. Why should two such
sharp teeth as the Volstead Act and the Jones "Five and
Ten" Law be provided for the clarification and enforcement
of the Eighteenth Amendment when no other Constitutional
Amendment is so favored? This is the first problem to which
the "three out of five" must address themselves.
Both the Volstead Act and the Jones Law may be repealed
by simple majorities of the House and Senate. Consequently,
granting a proper Congressional apportionment, a preponderant majority of the American people through their representation in Congress can and should effectuate the repeal
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of all Federal legislation that has been passed to clarify or
enforce the terms of the Eighteenth Amendment. Assuming
that this is done, what then will be the legal status of National Prohibition? The Eighteenth Amendment will remain
with all of its uncompromising prohibitions against the
"manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquor
for beverage purposes." But what penalties will now be
meted out if the prohibitions of the Eighteenth Amendment
are defied? The Congressional legislation providing penalties, padlocks, enforcement agents and procedures will have
been repealed. Since no penalty will be legally provided for,
it will be impossible for Federal courts to sentence liquor
violators. Thus, from the standpoint of criminality at least,
the Eighteenth Amendment will cease to be effective. The
several States of the Union may still go as far as they please
in, the direction of Prohibition enforcement but always by
virtue of their own State laws and appropriations. If at the
time of the repeal of the Federal Prohibition legislation any
State is without a State enforcement act (as is New York,
Wisconsin, Montana and Maryland at present) then the
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating beverages in that State would not be punishable either by State or
Federal authorities. If this condition eventually becomes intolerable the legislature "of the State will always be in a position to enact any Prohibition enforcement measure that it
feels to be desirable. It may, for instance, pass a law forbidding within the confines of the State the manufacture,
sale or transportation of any beverage containing more than
one half of one per-cent of alcohol and provide extreme
penalties for convicted violators. Such a statute will make
the State as "bone dry" as it was before the repeal of the
Volstead Act-but with these salutary differences: The law
will be consistent with the time-honored right of each State
to determine its own police regulations in accordance with
the will of its people. "Double jeopardy" for the same Pro-
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hibition violation will no longer be possible as it is at the
present time.$ The protection of Constitutional search warrant guaranties, now subject to nullification through the
collusion of State and Federal agents, would be restored. 4
Officers who killed or wounded persons in the process of law
enforcement would be tried by the courts of the State and
not as at present, by "foreign" Federal courts whose jurisdiction in such a case is, to say the least, extremely artificial.
So much for the State that elects to be "bone dry."
What course will be open to a jurisdiction that favors a
"wine and beer" regime with a strict prohibition of stronger
drinks? Would the legislature of such a State be in a position to pass a valid statute authorizing and licensing the
manufacture of beverages below a certain alcoholic content? No, for the reason that the Eighteenth Amendment
standing by itself forbids the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating beveragep, and consequently any State
3 At present, if "A" is apprehended selling liquor in a State having a State
Prohibition enforcement act he may be arrested tried and convicted by the State
authorities and sentenced to fine and imprisonment under the State law. Subsequently, after he has served his sentence or paid his fine or both, the Federal
authorities may institute charges against him under the Volstead Act, using the
same evidence that was presented in the State trial. Upon conviction in the Federal Court he may be required to pay another fine or serve another sentence or
both. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926). In this connection, see Manion,
What Price Prohibition? 2 NoTRE DAma L. 85 (Last citation, Editor's note.)
4 The Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution protects persons
against "unreasonable searches" and in most cases a warrant is required to make
the search reasonable and the evidence secured thereby properly presentable
against the defendant at the trial. This amendment restricts only Federal officers.
All States have similar provisions in their State constitutions or laws for the protection of their citizens against "unreasonable searches" by State officers. At present, in a State having a State Prohibition enforcement act, a State officer may
secure liquor evidence by an "unreasonable search" and while such evidence is
not presentable in a State prosecution of the defendant because of the State
Constitutional provision, the evidence may be turned over to the Federal authorities who may introduce it in a federal proceeding against the defendant. The
Federal Courts have held that the Federal Constitutional provision (Fourth
Amendment) restricts only Federal Officers, and all evidence, however procured,
by persons other than Federal officers may be used to secure the conviction of
accused persons in Federal courts. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
In this connection, see Manion, What Price Prohibition? supra, note 3, at 83, 84.
(Last citation,.Editor's note.)
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law positively permitting and authorizing a violation of the
Eighteenth Amendment would be held to be void. A similar
fate would wait upon the attempt of any State to set up
liquor control systems such as prevail in the provinces of
Canada. But the State legislature could pass a valid law forbidding and providing punishment for traffic in beverages
containing more than any stated percentage of alcohol. Such
a Statute would be perfectly consistent with the Eighteenth
Amendment as long as it did not positively authorize traffic
in alcoholic beverages. Liquor containing less alcohol than
the percentage fixed by the statute could then be freely
manufactured and sold in such a jurisdiction without fear of
punishment either by State or Federal authorities. However,
even where, because of the failure of the State to provide
punishment for it, traffic in alcoholic beverages may be
freely carried on, certain inevitable economic restrictions
will impede the business. Liquor dealers will not be permitted
to incorporate. State laws making it possible for alcoholic
beverage dealers to incorporate for the purpose of carrying
on that business would contravene the plain mandate of
the Eighteenth Amendment and would consequently be declared unconstitutional by the courts. Contracts for the sale
of alcoholic beverages will not be enforcible in either State
or Federal courts for the same reason. Thus the two indispensably necessary features of modern "Big Business"
namely, corporate and credit facilities will be denied to
liquor traders. They will be doomed to exist upon a cash
and carry basis as "small men." Strange as it may seem, this
will be one of the striking .advantages of the new system.
The political machinations of the "Liquor Trusts" and the
"Brewers' Associations" gave the Prohibitionist his first and
most effective argument. Very seldom did the literature or
oratory of the political liquor reformer take a position
against the consumption of 'alcoholics. This attitude was left
for the non-political temperance societies--and still is. The
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Supreme Court of the United States has recently upheld that
the Volstead Act shows no intention on part of Congress to
punish purchasers or. drinkers of intoxicants.5 Thus the evil
largely responsible for the adoption of the Eighteenth
Amendment will be definitely and permanently removed
under the system resulting from the repeal of Federal enforcement legislation, for the reason that there cannot conceivably be an operative influential "Trust" or "Association"
without the possibilities for incorporation and credit. In the
absence of these same corporate and credit facilities the subsidized "saloon chains" through which mammoth breweries
and distilleries controlled elections and disposed of their
enormous productions will be impossible. The saloon as it
was known before the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment will be no more.
Under the new system, liquor and liquor selling will be unlicensed and non-taxable. The Eighteenth Amendment standing alone will prevent the constitutionality of any State or
Federal law designed for such a purpose. This too, will doubtless prove to be a blessing in disguise. It is an historical fact
that when untaxed liquor was sold in general stores along
with sugar and kerosene there was no liquor problem in America. The trouble started when the intoxicating beverage was
singled out as a revenue producer. The "Whiskey Rebellion"
5 It is not a crime to purchase iltoxicants and the buyer is not an aider and
abettor of the seller. U. S. v. Kerper, 20 F. (2d) 744 (D. C. Pa. 1928), reversed
on other grounds but affirmed as to this point Norris v. U. S. 34 F. (2d) 839 (C.
C. A. Pa. 1929), and subsequently reversed on other grounds United States v.
Norris, 50 S. Ct. 424, 281 U. S. 619, 74 L. Ed. 1076 (1930). In the language of
Thomson, D. J., in Norris v. U. S., supra, "* * * It is conceded that, under the
Eighteenth Amendment, and the Volstead Act passed to carry it into effect, the
purchase of liquor is not made an offense. It follows that the purchase, as such,
does not subject the buyer to punishment. This is perfectly clear from the act
itself. Not only did Congress carefgllly exclude the purchaser from the penal
provisions of the act as originally passed, but has taken no step to extend its
provisions to the purchaser, in the 10 years of legislation which have since intervened. That the intention and purpose of Congress is in harmony with the act,
as drawn, is thus made perfectly manifest."
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of Washington's first administration has a much greater historical significance than is generally attached to it -for the
reason that the "rebellion" was brought about by the first
attempt of the government to tax intoxicants. It was the beginning of the parade to the Eighteenth Amendment: Thereafter liquor taxes were steadily increased until in 1919, more
than ninety cents of every dollar paid by the consumer for
alcoholic stimulants went either directly or indirectly to the
government for taxes and licenses. In order to show the same
relative margin of profit, the liquor dealer's gross sales volume was thus required to be ten times as great as that of the
average manufacturer of ordinary commodities. The soap
consumer for instance, who was also a liquor consumer,
would have to take ten ten-cent drinks for every single tencent bar of soap that he used, in order that the manufacturers of the respective commodities would be in the same
earning classification. The result of this burdensome taxation was first, "mass production" of intoxicants in the interest of lower costs; secondly, intensive campaigns for sales
promotion; thirdly, determined political manipulation by the
"liquor interests" in an effort to lower taxes and remove the
mounting legal restrictions upon the liquor business. These
three distinct results naturally became intensified with each
increase in liquor taxation. Conversely, the energy and influence of the Prohibitionists increased in just the proportion
that these stated results of liquor taxation became more
noticeable. It was a thoroughly "vicious circle" of activity
that was ultimately squared by the adoption of the
Eighteenth Amendment.
The "license system" made the price of liquor abnormally
high and this in turn made the intensive commercialization
of the liquor industry inevitable. With the repeal of Federal
enforcement legislation, liquor, where it is not prohibited by
State law, will be ridiculously cheap. Public officers being
without authority to suppress the traffic, there will be no
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necessity for bribes for "protection" as at present. Since
liquor dealing will no longer be punishable by fine or imprisonment, the dispensation of intoxicants will cease to be
the private and profitable preserve of gunmen and criminal
elements. On the other hand there will be no such thing as
the traditional "powerful liquor interests." The "merger"
trend that has recently swept factory and farm, butcher,
banker, baker and merchant into the watchful wardship of
the giant "chains" and "holding companies" will of necessity pass the liquor industry by. Exempt forever from corporate and credit influences, it bids fair to be the ultimate
last stand of individualism in business. In this particular field
"the man and his works" will maintain a natural and necessary adjacency. Quality of liquor, like the quality of food
will be determined by the discernment of the clientele, and
local reputations for wholesome dispensations will be built
and sustained accordingly. "Bonds" and "stamps" will lose
their magic; the purchaser will be called upon to exercise the
well-nigh atrophied faculties of individual judgment. Taking
it all in all, it is quite conceivable that we will have blundered
into a situation that will be unusually interesting and distinctly worth while.
Clarence Manion.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.

